Energy price reform in Iran can impose disproportionate welfare losses on lower expenditure deciles unless compensation is designed to preserve real purchasing power and remain fiscally feasible. This paper evaluates the welfare and distributional consequences of energy price reform using a calibrated decile-level dynamic framework. The analysis distinguishes between the household welfare-exposure base and the fiscal revenue base of reform. Welfare losses are measured using a broad energy and energy-intensive transport exposure basket, while fiscal compensation capacity is evaluated using a more conservative revenue base. Several policy scenarios are compared, including uncompensated reform, equal nominal transfers, controlled transfer indexation, full promised indexation, and a high fiscal-dominance case. The results show that uncompensated reform reduces welfare for the bottom 40 percent. Under the dual-base calibration, equal nominal transfers and controlled indexation substantially reduce welfare losses but do not fully protect the bottom 40 percent when the fiscal base is conservative. Full promised indexation can slightly improve lower-decile welfare but violates the fiscal feasibility constraint. The findings show that compensation failure arises from the mismatch between household welfare exposure and fiscally available reform revenue. The paper concludes that energy price reform should not be implemented as an isolated price adjustment, but as a fiscally feasible compensation package combining adequate compensation, controlled indexation, and sustainable financing.