Hadi Dibavand; Ali Taherifard; Ali Faridzad; Atefeh Taklif; mohammad mahdi bahrololoum
Abstract
IRAN`s new petroleum contract is a new generation of service contract which aimed to fix bugs from Buy-Back model. In this model some incentives have inserted to increase contractors' motivations. In this study, we consider fiscal differences and revenue division of the two models in the case of phases ...
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IRAN`s new petroleum contract is a new generation of service contract which aimed to fix bugs from Buy-Back model. In this model some incentives have inserted to increase contractors' motivations. In this study, we consider fiscal differences and revenue division of the two models in the case of phases 4 & 5 of the South Pars gas field. This study is conducted by fiscal simulation for two mentioned models and comparison the results. It is concluded that, government revenue in Buy-Back model throughout the period of production in phases 4 & 5 is bigger around 29% and 11% respectively in regard of the net present value and the discounted net present value. Also, if in Buy-Back model, production decline starts at the first year after fiscal settlement with contractor by the rate of more than 3% yearly, then it is better for the government to employ new contract model instead of Buy-Back model regarding revenue
Davood Manzoor; Roohollah Kohan Hoosh Nejad; Masoud Amani
Abstract
Fiscal regime is one of the main differences between petroleum contracts. Fiscal regimes in oil contracts are divided in two main categories namely Concessionary and Contractual Systems. In contractual systems, the main difference between service and production sharing contracts is the way of compensation ...
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Fiscal regime is one of the main differences between petroleum contracts. Fiscal regimes in oil contracts are divided in two main categories namely Concessionary and Contractual Systems. In contractual systems, the main difference between service and production sharing contracts is the way of compensation of contractor services which could be in cash or in kind. In production sharing contracts the contractor receives a portion of produced oil. One of the main criteria to compare fiscal regimes is government and contractor takes in real values. Comparing the net present value of contractor take shows that PSC could have been more desirable and cost effective in Azadegan, Soroush & Norouz, Forouzan & Esfandyar oil fields than Buy-Back contracts.
Mahdi Akhavan
Volume 4, Issue 13 , January 2015, , Pages 1-32
Abstract
An incomplete contract is an exchange in which some aspects of a transaction is unspecified. Contractual incompleteness decrease contract effectiveness. Buy-back contract has legal and contractual obligations witch incompleteness from some of these aspects is undesirable. This study analysis these obligations ...
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An incomplete contract is an exchange in which some aspects of a transaction is unspecified. Contractual incompleteness decrease contract effectiveness. Buy-back contract has legal and contractual obligations witch incompleteness from some of these aspects is undesirable. This study analysis these obligations in time, cost and repayment in phases 2&3 of south pars gas field in development period. Result shows that buy-back contract for phases 2&3 of south pars gas field is incomplete. Because of high transaction cost, parties bounded rationality, uncertainty, complexity and project time and necessarily lead not to perfect implementation of commitment. In transaction cost economics any contract is inevitably incomplete. Some mechanisms designed for gap filling in incomplete contract. In buy-back contract this mechanism is designed in joint management committee. Distribution of power between parties is equal and contract cannot adapt contract performance with initial contract.
Seyed Nasrullah Ebrahimi Seyed Nasrullah Ebrahimi; muhamad shyryjyan
Volume 3, Issue 10 , April 2014, , Pages 1-39
Abstract
This paper deals with the process of developments in upstream oil and gas contracts during 1979-1991 and 1992-2013. We will understand that any type of conventional contracts had not been concluded during 1979-1991 but in the latter period, three generations of Iranian service contracts named, “Buy-Back ...
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This paper deals with the process of developments in upstream oil and gas contracts during 1979-1991 and 1992-2013. We will understand that any type of conventional contracts had not been concluded during 1979-1991 but in the latter period, three generations of Iranian service contracts named, “Buy-Back Contracts” have been designed and implemented. Due to the necessity of designing new upstream contracts we intend to analyze that which of the conventional upstream contracts are compatible with the current sovereignty laws of oil and gas industry? Regarding the dominant regulations on this sector, what are the concerns and proposal framework of experts about the new contracts? Finally, it seems that the dominant legal requirements on oil and gas upstream sector with the principles of Buy-Back contracts are more convenient than other types of conventional contracts. Of course, the new contracts regarding the current legal capabilities, should be both the ability of answering to concerns of critics as well as suitable flexibility in terms of oil and gas fields of the country.
